# Popular Impact: Public Opinion and Planetary Defense Planning

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Joint work with Adi Rao, Erika Kristen Palmer, and Sarah Kreps

#### Motivation

What is the public's role in planetary defense?

- Previous research views the public as reactive, with little influence on planning.
  - Disaster Response: Managing public response to an actual crisis.
  - Educational Outreach: Informing the public about impact risks and planetary defense policies.
- Planners have limited information on how the public will engage with ongoing and future policies.

- Previous data paints a mixed picture of the public's risk assessment and matching policy preferences.
  - Survey research shows the public places asteroid impacts as nearly last in likelihood (Friedman 2018).
  - Other survey research has seen the public place planetary defense as a high priority (Funk and Strauss 2018).


- The public's preferences can be modeled as an expected utility function.
  - Expected Utility = Probability(Value of Risk Mitigated)
    -Cost of Mitigation + Secondary Costs/Benefits.
- Public opinion is sensitive to different types of information:
  - Probability of a disaster.
  - Effectiveness of risk mitigation methods.
  - The side-benefits and costs of investment into these methods.

#### Research Methods

International Planetary Defense Survey

- Sample: N = 2,997, US and UK.
- Non-experimental Exploratory Analysis.
  - Rank sources of information about planetary defense; provide estimate of the likelihood of asteroid impact.
    - Sources: Domestic Head of State, Foreign Head of State, UN Secretary General, Scientists and Researchers, and Private Space Companies.
- Two Experiments:
  - Conjoint experiment: varies technical, political, and temporal components of hypothetical planetary defense missions.
  - Survey vignette experiment: varies economic, political, and security side-benefits or opportunity costs of investment into planetary defense.

#### Results: Trust and Risk Perceptions




• As trust in scientists decreases, perception of asteroid impact increases.

#### Results: Trust and Risk Perceptions

	Dependent variable:					
	Asteroid Disaster Probability	Support (OLS)		Budget Change (OLS; robustness)		
	(Ordered					
	Logistic)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	
Distrust of Scientists	0.130***		-0.013		0.099	
	(0.048)		(0.019)		(0.213	
Asteroid Disaster Probability		0.077***		0.533***		
		(0.011)		(0.131)		
Conservatism	0.091***	-0.025**	-0.019	0.543***	0.565*	
	(0.034)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.148)	(0.150	
Male	-1.031***	0.169***	0.123***	-0.942***	-1.255*	
	(0.072)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.321)	(0.313	
White	-0.459***	0.007	-0.015	-0.034	-0.165	
	(0.091)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.412)	(0.412	
A	-0.004*	-0.003***		-0.045***		
Age	(0.002)	(0.003	(0.001)	(0.045	(0.010	
	-0.015					
Income	-0.015 (0.012)	-0.002 (0.005)	-0.003 (0.005)	-0.082 (0.054)	-0.08	
		· · ·	· /	· · ·		
Education	-0.133***	-0.001	-0.007	-0.053	-0.090	
	(0.025)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.111)	(0.111	
Reputation	0.213***	0.083***	0.091***	0.378***	0.440*	
	(0.032)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.142)	(0.142	
Space Priority	0.290***	0.313***	0.325***	0.192	0.282	
	(0.036)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.158)	(0.157	
US Sample	0.020	0.034	0.038	-0.407	-0.401	
	(0.074)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.328)	(0.330	
Constant		1.747***	1.907***	1.610	2.486*	
		(0.087)	(0.088)	(0.998)	(1.005	
Observations	2,971	2,971	2,971	2,971	2,971	
R <sup>2</sup>		0.249	0.237	0.027	0.021	
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>		0.246	0.235	0.024	0.018	
Residual Std. Error (df = 2960)		0.727	0.733	8.354	8.377	
F Statistic (df = 10; 2960)		98.082***	92.081***	8.166***	6.488*	

#### Results: Mission Preferences

- Respondents prefer multilateral, early launch, kinetic impactor missions.
- Active dislike of acting unilaterally, utilizing nuclear explosives, or launching later.



#### Results: Mission Preferences


	DV = Support
(Intercept)	3.991***
	(0.023)
Cooperation = Unilaterally, without other countries	-0.562***
	(0.025)
Payload = A nuclear explosive device	-0.647***
	(0.027)
Timing = Late, closer to earth impact time	-0.585***
	(0.026)
Num.Obs.	8913
R2	0.179
R2 Adj.	0.179
RMSE	1.10
Std.Errors	<u>by:</u> id

+ p < 0.1, \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001 Note: we represent a larger N given each observation is presented three randomized conjoint selections.

## Results: Supplemental Benefits

• Economic development and dual-use security applications correlate with modest increases in support for higher investment.

Treatment Effects by Ideology and Sample




# Results: Supplemental Benefits

	Treatments	With Demographics	With Space- relevant			
			Controls			
(Intercept)	3.179***	3.281***	1.915***			
	(0.038)	(0.084)	(0.090)			
Economic	0.083+	0.095*	0.140***			
	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.042)			
Leadership	-0.112*	-0.118*	-0.054			
	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.043)			
Opp. Cost	-0.082 +	-0.094+	-0.029			
	(0.049)	(0.048)	(0.043)			
Security	0.054	0.060	0.093*			
	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.042)			
US Sample	0.141***	0.148***	0.031			
	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.029)			
Male		0.218***	0.105***			
		(0.031)	(0.028)			
White		0.047	-0.028			
		(0.040)	(0.036)			
Age		-0.003**	-0.004***			
		(0.001)	(0.001)			
Income		-0.002	-0.002			
		(0.005)	(0.005)			
Education		-0.009	-0.012			
		(0.011)	(0.010)			
Party		-0.033*	-0.017			
		(0.015)	(0.013)			
Reputation			0.093***			
			(0.012)			
DART			0.149***			
			(0.031)			
Space Priority			0.314***			
			(0.014)			
Num Obs.	2971	2971	2971			
R2	0.015	0.037	0.251			
R2 Adi.	0.014	0.034	0.247			
AIC	7345.0	7289.9	6551.5			
BIC	7387.0	7367.9	6647.4			
LogLik	-3665.516	-3631.971	-3259.728			
P	9.246	10.434	70.650			
RMSE	0.83	0.82	0.72			
+ p < 0.1, * $p < 0.05$ , ** $p < 0.01$ , *** $p < 0.001$						

## Results: Budget Change

• Respondents allocate an average of 3 percent more to planetary defense at the end of the survey.




- The public supports investment in planetary defense despite it being a "Black Swan" event.
- The public has strong preferences for the characteristics of a deflection mission.
- Budget allocations increase with information, so education and informational outreach can enhance public support.

Thank you!

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#### Questions?



Priorities for preventive action: Explaining Americans' divergent reactions to 100 public risks.
 Friedman, Jeffrey A.
 American Journal of Political Science 63.1, 2019.
 Majority of Americans believe it is essential that the US remain a

global leader in space. Cary Funk and Mark Strauss.

Pew Research Center, 2018.